

18 March 1976

Dr. Chamberlain

Re: Comments on Options for USIB Reorganization, 15 March 1976

1. Again, the need for a master plan for Community management is illustrated by these options. Without a concept of what the IC Staff, NIO Staff, CFI Committees, etc., are suppose to do, it is difficult to see if these options are duplicatory or if some management functions are uncovered. For instance, many of the functions concerning requirements and coordination proposed to be carried out by the ICS or NIO are included in the tasks for these Boards and Committees.

2. The five functions described in the introduction are those appropriate to a board which substantively supports the DCI. The evaluation function is missing, however.


3. There is a need for a group to advise the DCI on customer needs and evaluation of products, like the NIRB proposed in Option IV. Such a group might better be composed of rotating representatives of key customers in foreign policy and military planning (State, JCS, NSC Staff, etc.) rather than key intelligence officers. This could be staffed on a rotating basis.

4. I find Option I with committees supporting a substantive board, plus an outside review board (as in Option III, modified as in para 3 above) the most straightforward approach. The committee structure should be revised to emphasis the substantive approach to the NFIB's responsibilities and to add balance to the supporting committee structure. I would propose the following NFIB committees to each handle Functions 1-4 in their respective areas:

Sov Bloc  
China  
European

Middle East  
Asian  
Latin American  
Africa  
Economic  
Scientific  
Strategic Weapons

The responsibilities of the source committees could be handled by the IC Staff. This approach would help in defining a clearer division of functional responsibilities between the NFIB and its committees, other DCI coordinating committees (such as Security and Oversight), various staffs and the Program Manager in their respective DCI supporting roles.



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Comments on IC Staff Paper  
"Options for USIB Reorganization"

These remarks perforce are very preliminary as apparently are the options presented in the IC paper. As a general reaction, this seems to be another example of the Elizabeth Arden approach to Community organization--namely, that if you apply enough cosmetics, nobody will know that the CIA exists.

We can start off agreeing with the IC Staff that a USIB-type mechanism needs to be continued regardless of what it is called. A general problem with the IC proposal is that the proliferation and interlaying of any number of new boards above the existing Committee structure seems to be an inefficient way to set about doing business. We would all be well advised to try to keep our structures, whether they are in the substantive side of the Community or the resource side of the Community, as simple as possible.

Regarding the membership of USIB, there are advantages to having the permanent membership be composed exclusively of

CIA, DIA and State, but the exclusion of the service representatives would probably create more problems than it solves. If there is valid concern about the Community image, then we should all be prepared to live with a substitute for USIB which is composed pretty much of the same membership. Given the overriding concern of a reconstituted USIB with substantive intelligence matters, its membership should not be expanded by bringing in such organizations as the NRO. After all, a recreated USIB as part of the substantive structure of the Community is still going to have some organization concerned with those present SIGINT and COMIREX Committee responsibilities set up to facilitate the transmission of consumer needs and priorities to system operators.

Although the IC papers do not outline specifically how they would work, the options are troublesome, particularly those which apparently transfer all parts of the collection committees of the present USIB to CFI or IC control. The major problem is

that the IC options fail to discriminate between the policy-guidance functions performed by such as the SIGINT and COMIREX Committees and their day-to-day operative functions whereby they link users of the system product and the operators of the system.

The IC options need to consider more carefully their arrangements for determining consumer needs and evaluating the responsiveness of Community productions. In at least one option, both of these functions are done by producers. This is unwise, for producers should not be asked to evaluate their own product. The assignment of these functions to a board of the same apparent bureaucratic status as the NFIB also seems to be questionable.

Some of the IC options would put the Security Committee under CFI/IC subordination. The very personal responsibilities of the DCI for the protection of sources and methods and the establishment of an effective program for declassifying classified materials make it imperative that the USIB Security Committee be responsible directly to the DCI.

The Information Handling Committee is assumed in the IC options to survive as it is presently constituted. CIA believes this is one committee which requires a very basic re-examination of its functions and responsibilities before any decision is made regarding the retention of the committee or its proper place in the Community organization.

CIA objects to those options which put the Interagency Defector Committee under CFI/IC. Given the nature of this committee and its very special relationship to CIA activities, if the committee survives, it should be retained in the organization controlled by the Deputy for the CIA.

The Committee on Exchanges is also another committee which, because of its close relationship with producer organizations either in terms of articulating requirements or assessing the gains/losses of exchanges, needs to be retained in the substantive side of the Community.

The CIA View

In the CIA view the USIB should be reorganized along the lines presented in the 2 March 1976 memorandum from the CIA Member USIB.

The essentials of this proposal are:

- A reconstituted USIB be charged only with substantive matters.
- The CCPC should be abolished.
- The IHC should be re-examined in order to redefine its responsibilities.
- The production oriented USIB Committees, e. g., EIC, STIC, should not be a part of the CFI/IC segment of the Community.
- A division of responsibilities between the substantive and resource sides of the Community should be made for collection oriented committees, e. g., COMIREX, SIGINT, HRC.

- The IDC should be a part of the organization controlled by the DD/CIA.
- The Security Committee should be directly responsible to the DCI.

CIA is in the process of preparing a statement illustrating the detailed application of these views. It should be ready early next week.



MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Lehman

The attached paper on the IC options for reorganizing USIB represents the preliminary views of the four ADDs. Please note that we are asking for time to prepare a detailed statement. We would hope that the IC options paper would not be presented to the DCI--for educational or other reasons--until the CIA paper is completed.

[REDACTED]  
Paul V. Walsh  
ADDI

cc: ADDA  
ADDO  
ADDS&T  
Dr. Chamberlain

[REDACTED]  
Mr. Taylor

[REDACTED] Date 18 March 1976

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## OPTIONS FOR USIB REORGANIZATION

### Introduction

The following options were organized after careful review of the comments by USIB principals. There is a general consensus that a USIB-type mechanism, by whatever name, should continue to exist. As a functional formulation, five areas or problems need to be served by whatever options are structured.

Each of the three options presented below contain elements which are designed to cope with all five of the functions discussed. In all instances, the Board or Boards which would be established would be advisory to the DCI, with no final decision responsibilities.

#### 1. Coordination of the National Intelligence Production Effort

The DCI needs an advisory group of Community members to review and coordinate on major national intelligence estimative products and substantive output activities. This includes national estimates, selected interagency studies, and the information flow and dialogue on the Intelligence Community's warning and crisis network (e.g., alert memorandums).

#### 2. Substantive Requirements Generation and Priorities

The basis for intelligence collection and production is the need for information from a foreign environment.

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These initial or substantive requirements are normally geo-topical expressions (target oriented) derived from information needs of the non-intelligence consumer world. Their structure is hierarchial, which means that the DCI requires a mechanism for the initial statement and prioritization of requirements to serve as guidance to intelligence operations and planning. At the present time the KIQs, Perspectives, and DCID 1/2 Attachment serve this function. All are now subject to USIB review.

3. Collection Systems Requirements Coordination and Operational Guidance

Substantive requirements and priorities provide initial guidance to intelligence collection systems. However, each collection organization must expand, translate, and re-prioritize based upon operational variables to achieve the most effective information return. Under the USIB, the COMIREX, SIGINT Committee, and Human Resources Committee were charged with this function under USIB guidance and review. Additional functions in this area have to do with arrangements with foreign governments for intelligence purposes, which is a DCI responsibility.

4. Producer/Consumer Relationships and Consumer Research and Assessment

Intelligence is a service function and must have a continuous and effective dialogue with those it serves. In

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addition, intelligence organizations must constantly research the needs of its consumers. The NSCIC and the NSCIC Working Group represented an attempt to obtain direct inputs from consumers. There is still some feeling in the Community that this function should be addressed through an organized mechanism as well as through informal means.

5. Protection of Sources and Methods and Other Support Functions

The DCI requires an advisory group of senior Intelligence Community members to coordinate appropriate programs developed to properly protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical procedures. With the heavy emphasis to downgrade and declassify intelligence information consistent with Executive Order No. 11652 for wider dissemination, functions and procedures to ensure the protection of sources and methods must be constantly researched to ensure proper implementation of both activities.

Additional support functions such as take place in the Information Handling Committee and the Committee on Exchanges are also currently reviewed by USIB, and their continued review is envisioned in the options.

Committee Reorientation

In all of the options presented for USIB reorganization the present committees would continue to function. They have been renamed DCI Committees in the options in order to

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emphasize the need for flexibility with respect to their tasking by the DCI for other Community support purposes such as the CFI. Their orientation in the options below stresses functional associations. For example, the substantively oriented committees are aligned in support of the National Production Mechanism, while the collection and support-oriented committees, most of whose chairmen are members of the IC Staff, are aligned functionally.

#### Membership

The alternatives for membership in any reorganized USIB structure are designed to provide the broadest participation by the members of the Intelligence Community.

Alternative A provides that the membership consist of all of those organizations designated as being part of the Intelligence Community in Section I of Executive Order 11905. This would include CIA, NSA, DIA, NRO, Army, Air Force, FBI, State Department, Treasury, and ERDA.

Alternative B provides that the current membership and participant practices of the USIB be maintained with the military services as observers and NRO participating as required.

Alternative C provides that a reorganized USIB consist of only three permanent members, CIA, DIA, and State with all others having membership in an "on call" basis

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participating only when items of direct interest to those agencies are involved. In Alternative C the "on call" members would be FBI, the military services, NSA, Treasury, NRO, ERDA, and ACDA.

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OPTION I

-- Creates a National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; chaired by DCI.

-- Creates a National Production Mechanism to coordinate the substantive production committees -- WSSIC, EIC, STIC, JAEIC, and SAL to advise the DCI on national intelligence production with appropriate review by the NFIB.

-- Places the responsibility on the Intelligence Community Staff for coordinating the support of the collection committees (SIGINT, COMIREX, and HRC) and the support committees (Security and IHC) in support of the new NFIAB. However, the committees will report directly to the NFIAB.

-- Provides for direct NFIAB dialogue and designated meetings on consumer problems with the various agency and department members addressing their respective consumer views.

Pros


- Retains a single board of all Community members participating.
- Provides strong review and coordination for national production.
- Coordinates all support matters through the Intelligence Community Staff.
- Provides a central role for collection committees.

Cons

- Has appearance of little or no change except in name.
- Highly dependent upon Community participation in national production mechanism.

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OPTION I



- Function 1. Coordination of the National Intelligence Production Effort  
Function 2. Substantive Requirements Generation and Priorities  
Function 3. Collection Systems Requirements Coordination and Operational Guidance  
Function 4. Producer/Consumer Relationships and Assessments  
Function 5. Protection of Sources and Methods and Other Support Functions

\*Chairman and permanent committee staff part of IC Staff.



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OPTION II

-- Creates a National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as replacement for USIB; chaired by the DCI.

-- Creates new National Intelligence Review Board chaired by the DCI with members being the chiefs of the intelligence production agencies (i.e., DIA, INR, CIA). The NIRB would be responsible for identifying major customer problems and reactions to intelligence products. It also would review substantive requirements generation and priorities. Principal consumers (e.g., Treasury, JCS, National Security Affairs, National Security Staff, Commerce, etc.) would be invited to the monthly meetings as appropriate.

-- Continues support to the NFIAB and the NIRB from all existing USIB committees.

Pros


Cons

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| -- Retains a single production-oriented board of all Community members including Services and NRO.  | -- Provides for little change from present USIB. |
| -- Provides strong coordination of national production.   | -- NIRB may be ineffective.                      |
| -- Provides strong impetus for consumer research and assessment of product utility by making this a specific task for which chiefs of production organizations would be responsible to the DCI. |  |
| -- Minimum disruption of present Community mechanisms.  |  |

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OPTION II



WSSIC  
STIC  
EIC  
JAEIC  
SMG  
COMIREX  
SIGINT  
HRC  
DEF COM  
COMEX  
SEC COM  
IHC  
CCPC

- Function 1. Coordination of the National Intelligence Production Effort
- Function 2. Substantive Requirements Generation and Priorities
- Function 3. Collection Systems Requirements Coordination and Operational Guidance
- Function 4. Producer/Consumer Relationships and Assessments
- Function 5. Protection of Sources and Methods and Other Support Functions

\*To support both NFIAB and NIRB.

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OPTION III

-- Creates a National Foreign Intelligence Production Board; chaired by the DCI.

-- Provides for support of the NFIAB by the existing substantive committees, i.e., WSSIC, JAEIC, STIC, EIC, and SMG.

-- Creates a new National Intelligence Support Board, chaired by the D/DCI/IC, to deal with (a) integration of collection requirements and guidance, and (b) other support committee activities. Committees operating under this Board would be COMIREX, SIGINT, HRC, COMEX, IDC, and Security. Membership would be composed of the NFIPB principals or their deputies.

-- Creates a new National Intelligence Review Board chaired by the DCI with members being the chiefs of the intelligence production agencies (i.e., DIA, INR, CIA). The NIRB would be responsible for identifying major customers information needs and reactions to intelligence products. The Board would also review substantive requirements generation and priorities. Principal consumers, e.g., Treasury, JCS, DDR&E, National Security Affairs, NSC Staff, Commerce, Agriculture, ACDA, etc., would be invited to monthly meetings as appropriate.

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Pros


- Provides strong emphasis to National Intelligence.
- Provides strong impetus for consumer research and assessment of product utility.
- Provides a better alignment of Community resource and policy matters through the D/DCI/IC to CFI.
- Provides a balance of emphasis on national production and resource management role of the DCI.
- Provides for collection operations and priorities control.
- Provides a strong image of DCI's Community role.

Cons

- Creates three Boards and inherent interface problems.
- NIRB may be ineffective.
- Functions and interface between IC Staff and NISB Committee vague.
- Administrative and technical support more complicated.

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
OPTION III



- Function 1. Coordination of the National Intelligence Production Effort
- Function 2. Substantive Requirements Generation and Priorities
- Function 3. Collection Systems Requirements Coordination and Operational Guidance
- Function 4. Producer/Consumer Relationships and Assessments
- Function 5. Protection of Sources and Methods and Other Support Functions

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OPTION I



\*Chairman and permanent committee staff part of IC Staff.

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